Introduction
The advent in the nineteenth century of the limited liability corporation is typically regarded as a key step in the development of modern capital markets and a precursor of large-scale industrialization. In the traditional view, limited liability reduced transactions costs associated with issuing marketable securities, which in turn permitted improved risk sharing and investment on a larger scale than previously. 1 This perspective on the incorporation decision leaves unexplained a number of aspects of the historical experience with liability reform. In Great Britain, for example, firms were extremely slow to incorporate following the introduction of general limited liability in 1856; most large-scale firms in many industries remained partnerships until the end of the century, relying on private and internal sources of finance in lieu of new debt and equity issues. This decision apparently reflected a widespread belief that limited firms were riskier than average and would face higher costs of capital. Indeed, we present new evidence below that default rates were higher among the earliest limited firms. Moreover, the traditional view suggests that liability reform, in reducing transactions costs, should lead to a rise in economic activity and efficiency. In fact, British economic growth in the late nineteenth century appears to have lagged behind that of Germany, the U.S., and other countries that had introduced the corporate form much earlier.
In this paper, we analyze the effects liability rules can have on incorporation and investment decisions of firms. In the traditional view (Posner, 1976, e.g.) , the transfer of risk from shareholders to creditors associated with incorporation should have no impact on the firm's cost of capital or level of investment, as yields on limited liability debt should rise to compensate bondholders for the risk of default. Equity investors therefore receive no transfer through the choice of liability regime, and the value of the firm remains unchanged. Thus limited liability was not a boon to shareholders, nor did it reduce the cost of capital for firms, except through its indirect effects on transactions costs in securities markets.
In contrast, we argue that liability rules can indeed have real effects on the economy, through their impact on the degree of adverse selection in corporate capital markets. In the model, as with Posner's argument, adoption of limited liability yields a risk premium on the firm's debt in equilibrium. In contrast, however, the equilibrium risk premium in the model reflects that of the average firm: low-risk firms therefore pay too much for debt, while high-risk firms are subsidized in equilibrium. We study how the resulting adverse selection among limited liability firms affects investment in equilibrium, and how the degree of adverse selection can in turn be influenced by the level of transactions costs firms must incur to obtain limited liability.
We summarize the results of the paper as follows. Section 2 discusses the introduction of the modern corporation in Great Britain in 1856. There we cite historical evidence to suggest that the rate of new incorporations following the reforms was extremely low, due at least in part to pessimistic beliefs of investors about the average quality of limited companies. We also produce new data which supports the adverse selection view: failure rates among the earliest limited companies were indeed significantly higher than for a comparable sample of unlimited companies.
Section 3 introduces our model of adverse selection in limited and unlimited liability credit markets. In Section 4 we show that, when firms may choose their liability status, credit markets can have multiple equilibria, each associated with different, self-fulfilling beliefs of investors about the average quality of limited companies and different levels of aggregate investment. Consequently, "animal spirits" of investors play a crucial role in avoiding development traps. We then study the effects of a reform that lowers the costs of incorporation for firms. We show that such a reform tends to increase the number of incorporations and the level of investment in the economy. Because multiple equilibria typically exist in the market, the timing of this response is difficult to predict. The effect of reforms on equilibrium interest rates and adverse selection is more ambiguous, however. We show that in some cases interest rates initially fall and then rise as the costs of incorporation decrease, as first high-quality then low-quality firms are induced to incorporate. Section 5 discusses the qualitative implications of our formal results, and section 6 concludes.
Since our interest is in incorporation and default, the body of the paper focuses on credit (bond) market equilibrium. However, nineteenth century corporations also raised funds through equity issues. In order to demonstrate that both our results and insights also apply to more general environments, in an appendix we extend the model so that entrepreneur can issue outside debt and/or equity. We find that although the existence of an equity market may attenuate the adverse selection effect in the incorporation decision, it cannot, in general, eliminate it.
Liability reform in Great Britain

Previous literature
General limited liability began in Great Britain with the Joint-Stock Companies Act of 1856, which permitted companies to limit the liability of equity owners for the company's debts to be no greater than their initial investment. 2 Limited liability was to be generally available to firms for a fee-a specific act of Parliament had previously been required for each firm desiring limited status-but new disclosure requirements would be imposed on limited firms.
A puzzling feature of the British experience is the exceptionally slow development of corporate capital markets in the period following the reforms. Many early firms established with limited liability were small and not particularly long-lived (Heaton, 1948) . Retentions remained the most important source of finance throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century (Payne, 1978) . This slow rate of incorporation was particularly evident among, but not confined to, family-operated firms. In this regard, the experience of English companies appears to have differed from that of companies in Germany, the United States, and other countries, during the period. As Forbes (1986) notes, the reluctance to adopt limited liability in England is particularly striking, given that liability reform occurred later and industrial capital demands were higher there than in the United States. 3 The reluctance of investors to accept limited liability seems to have been associated with the belief that limited companies would be more prone to default, fraud, and other malfeasance. Contemporary accounts suggest that investors and policy-makers alike were concerned with the way liability rules affected the potential for malfeasance by stock promoters and the functioning of capital markets in general. To its opponents, liability reform would lead to fraud and excessive risk taking, according to Shannon (1931) , and enterprise would function better if "kept within salutary bounds by dread of loss." (p. 374) The debates in Hansard in the period prior to 1856 indicated general concern that incorporation would undermine the reputation of British merchants with trading partners and general creditors. Hannah (1976) notes that "even those who accepted . . . its favorable effects on investment saw little future for the new companies.... Suppliers and customers, it was thought, would be reluctant to deal with them. " (p. 20) Indeed, these pessimistic beliefs appear largely to have been borne out in the experience of limited firms in the generation following the 1856 reform. Shannon (1932) reported that, of 4839 incorporations in the 1856-65 period, 50.1 per cent ceased operation within three years and 58.5 per cent within five years. 4 These failure rates are particularly high, given that the sample is restricted to publicly traded joint-stock companies, which presumably were among the most stable firms in the period. This record of failure was related to the reluctance of large firms to adopt limited liability. By the 1880s, less than 10 per cent of large-scale businesses had incorporated Forbes (1986) .
New evidence
While Shannon's data are suggestive of high default risk among early limited liability corporations, they are not particularly conclusive. High default rates might have been common among all firms in the period, including partnerships and unlimited liability companies. For this reason, we collected new data for the period and compare failure rates of limited and unlimited corporations in the period immediately following the 1856 reform. To do so we exploit a "grandparent" provision of the 1856 legislation: jointstock companies which had been registered under earlier legislation, and which by statute operated with unlimited liability, were required to register again under the new Act, claiming either limited or unlimited liability. Approximately one-third of these existing firms chose to adopt limited liability, while the rest continued to operate as before. Thus comparing default rates of the two classes of firms appears the most appropriate way to determine whether there was in fact adverse selection among early limited companies. Both groups operated at the same time and comprise approximately the same age-distribution of firms. Moreover, it is possible to control for innate differences in risk among industries in making the comparison.
The data for the study are derived from an 1864 report by the Registrar of Companies to Parliament, 5 which records the liability choices and op-4 Many of these companies failed very soon after incorporations, and so might not have raised much capital from outside investors. If these companies are excluded, more conservative estimates of the failure rates are obtained: 22.3 per cent after three years and 35.4 per cent after five years. erating status of corporations registering under the Act between 1856 and 1864. In the analysis, we focus on the subsample of 534 English companies which were in existence at the time of passage of the Act and which had re-registered prior to 1861; 186 of these adopted limited liability, while the remaining 348 retained unlimited liability. Table 1 records the failure rates of firms in the sample by broad industry category and by chosen liability status. The table indicates that 27 per cent of limited firms and 17 per cent of unlimited firms had failed by 1864; the difference in aggregate failure rates is significantly different from zero at the five per cent level. Failure rates were higher for limited firms in three of our five broad industry groups. In two industries-manufacturing, which includes public utilities, and trade and commerce, which includes a number of overseas trading ventures-the difference is significant at the five per cent level. Arguably, problems of asymmetric information may have been greater among firms operating abroad, which could explain the greater evidence of adverse selection in the latter industry. Failure rates were in fact lower among limited firms in the remaining two industries, although not significantly so. The difference is more pronounced among firms in the transportation sector, which includes a number of municipal and regional railways. Since the large railways had earlier been incorporated with limited liability by separate acts of Parliament, investors may have been less troubled by the risks of limited liability in this sector, so that no adverse selection occurred. Thus the data are broadly indicative of the notion that firms choosing limited liability were more likely to fail, and that adverse selection may have occurred.
In summary, historical evidence suggests that firms were slow to adopt limited liability in Great Britain, despite the significant liberalizations of the 1856 reforms. Most large, private firms continued to operate as partnerships, with unlimited liability, until late in the century. Contemporary accounts suggest the reluctance of firms to incorporate was strongly linked to the perception that limited firm posed greater risk of failure for creditors and equity investors. (Indeed, this perception appears to have played a role in the delayed introduction of limited liability in Great Britain, as many policy makers feared limited liability could lead to a crisis of confidence in capital markets.) Our data indicate this perception may have been accurate. In a small sample of highly comparable firms, limited liability companies failed with significantly greater probability than unlimited liability companies, even over a short period of time. Thus adverse selection among limited liability companies appears to have been a reality.
A model of debt finance
At date 0 an entrepreneur is endowed with an investment project that requires a capital outlay of K . With probability p, the project is successful and pays A/p at date 1; with complementary probability it is unsuccessful and pays nothing. There are two types of investment projects. A safe project, S, is successful with probability p S and a risky project, R, is successful with probability p R > 0, where p S > p R . Note that both the safe and risky projects have an expected payoff of A.
An entrepreneur can be either wealthy, W , or poor, P . A wealthy entrepreneur receives an exogenous private wealth payoff of w > K at date 1, while a poor entrepreneur receives nothing. An entrepreneur is thus one of four possible types, where his type depends upon project risk, S or R, and his wealth, W or P . An entrepreneur's type is denoted by t ∈ {RP, SP, RW, SW }. The prior probability that the entrepreneur is wealthy is ω, where 0 < ω < 1, and the prior probability that he is endowed with the safe project is σ, where 0 < σ < 1. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that the 7 two characteristics that define the entrepreneur's type are independently distributed. So, for example, the probability that the entrepreneur is of type
The entrepreneur does not have any liquid assets that can be used to finance the investment opportunity at date 0. He must, therefore, raise funds in capital markets if he wishes to undertake the project. The entrepreneur can borrow funds from capital markets in one of two ways. First, the entrepreneur can issue limited liability debt. Historical evidence from both the UK and US indicates that it was costly to issue limited liability debt. We model this cost by assuming that the entrepreneur must incorporate in order to be able to issue limited liability debt and that the cost of incorporation is B > 0. Hence, an incorporated entrepreneur issues limited liability debt in exchange for K + B . Second, the entrepreneur can issue unlimited liability debt. Issuing unlimited liability debt does not require that the entrepreneur incorporate. Hence, an unincorporated entrepreneur will issue unlimited liability debt in exchange for K .
We assume that the incorporation cost B is below the threshold level B = A − K at which projects are profitable even when undertaken by limited liability borrowing, i.e.,
If the entrepreneur issues limited liability debt, then the lender is only able to extract the promised debt payment from the project's payoff. That is, if the entrepreneur fails to make the promised payment, the creditor can only seize the value of the entrepreneur's project, up to the promised face value of debt. If the entrepreneur finances his investment project with unlimited liability debt, then the lender is able to extract the promised payment from both the project payoff and the entrepreneur's private wealth. If the entrepreneur fails to repay his unlimited liability debt in full because he lacks resources, then he suffers a large loss in utility. 6 At date 0, the entrepreneur's type is private information. We assume that there exist at least two lenders in the capital market, each with enough resources to satisfy the entrepreneur's financing needs. At date 1, the lender can observe both the project payoff and the entrepreneur's wealth. The entrepreneur and lenders are risk neutral. For simplicity, we assume that personal discount rates and the riskless interest rate are zero. The timing of the investment-financing game is as follows. At date 0, the entrepreneur chooses to: (i) incorporate and attempt to obtain K + B in capital markets by issuing limited liability debt, (ii) remain unincorporated and attempt to obtain K in capital markets by issuing unlimited liability debt, or (iii) completely forego the investment project and exit the market. Lenders observe these actions. If a lender decides to extend capital to the entrepreneur, then he offers a (gross) interest rate, r , to the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur will accept financing from the lender offering the lowest interest rate, r , and invests in the project. If the entrepreneur issues unlimited liability debt, then he receives K at date 0 and promises to pay back K r at date 1; if he issues limited liability debt, then he receives K + B at date 0 and promises to pay back (K + B ) r at date 1. At date 1, the investment project pays either A/p or 0. If the entrepreneur is wealthy, he receives an additional payoff of w at this time. Payments are exchanged between the entrepreneur and the lender as specified in their debt contract and the game ends.
The equilibrium concept that we will adopt is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, (PBE). A PBE for our game specifies:
1. a strategy for each type of entrepreneur, where the entrepreneur's strategy is (a) to incorporate and seek limited liability funding; to remain unincorporated and seek unlimited liability funding; or to forego the investment project and exit the market (b) to choose a lender (if investment funds are forthcoming) on the basis of the gross interest rate offered by all lenders.
2. a strategy for each lender, where a lender's strategy is to offer to provide, or not, investment funding K for an unincorporated entrepreneur and K + B for an incorporated entrepreneur and, if funding is offered, a gross interest rate, r .
3. beliefs that lenders hold about entrepreneurial type.
Strategies and beliefs satisfy sequential rationality and, whenever possible, Bayes' rule.
4 Analysis with Debt Finance
The historical puzzle that we are addressing is that, loosely speaking, in the latter half of the nineteenth century the costs associated with incorporationand, hence, the cost of issuing limited liability debt-dramatically fell in both the US and the UK. Borrowers in the US responded in great numbers by switching from unlimited liability to limited liability debt finance, while the in UK borrowers by and large continued to finance with unlimited liability debt. We are interested in understanding how changes in the cost of incorporation, B , affect the level of investment and the method of finance. In this section we will characterize the various equilibrium configurations that may arise and describe how an equilibrium is affected when the cost of incorporation is changed.
Since there is a large penalty associated with defaulting on unlimited liability debt, a poor entrepreneur's expected payoff will be negative if he borrows with unlimited liability debt. Therefore, any entrepreneur who finances with unlimited liability debt is wealthy. Competition among lenders implies that the gross rate of interest for an unlimited liability loan is equal to one, since such a loan carries no risk. The expected project payoff for a wealthy entrepreneur who finances his investment project with unlimited liability debt, V U , is simply V U = A − K . Let π represent a lender's belief about the success rate of a project that is financed with limited liability debt and let r π represent the gross interest rate charged for a limited liability loan by a lender with belief π. Competition implies that r π generates zero expected profits for lenders. The interest rate r π equates total amount loaned out, K + B , with the expected payoff associated with the loan, π [r π (K + B )]. Zero expected profits for lenders implies that r π = 1/π. Since p R ≤ π ≤ p S , it will be the case that
Denote the expected project payoff to an entrepreneur with success probability p who finances with limited liability debt by
(1)
Therefore, the RP -type entrepreneur will always invest in the project-using limited liability debtbecause the interest rate charged for a limited liability loan is r π ≤ 1/p R or p R /π ≤ 1; this implies that the project will generate a strictly positive expected payoff of at least A −K −B . Because the RP -type entrepreneur always borrows with limited liability debt, it will always be the case that r π > 1/p S . As a result, the SW -type entrepreneur will never finance with limited liability debt, since the expected payoff associated with this strategy is strictly less than V U = A − K . Therefore, two of the four possible entrepreneurial types have dominant strategies: the RP -type entrepreneur always invests and finances with limited liability debt and the SW -type entrepreneur always invests and finances with unlimited liability debt.
The remainder of the analysis explores the investment and financing strategies of the RW -and SP -type entrepreneurs. The RW -type entrepreneur always invests in the project since he can obtain an expected project payoff of at least V U = A − K > 0 by financing with unlimited liability debt. However, depending upon the interest rate that prevails for limited liability debt, the SP -type entrepreneur may or may not invest. So the analysis boils down to understanding the conditions under which 1. the SP -type entrepreneur chooses to invest (or not), and 2. the RW -type entrepreneur chooses to finance with limited or unlimited liability debt.
Before we characterize the various equilibrium outcomes, we can identify a situation that cannot arise in equilibrium when B > 0: one in which the SP -type entrepreneur exits the market and does not invest, while the RW -type entrepreneur finances his investment with limited liability debt. In this situation, the interest rate on limited liability debt will be equal to 1/p R since only risky entrepreneurs-RP-and RW -types-issue limited liability debt. The project payoff to an RW -type entrepreneur is A −K −B because he finances his investment with unlimited liability debt. But this entrepreneur can obtain an expected project payoff of V U = A − K if he finances with unlimited liability debt, since he avoids the incorporation cost, B , associated with limited liability debt.
The issue facing the SP -type entrepreneur is whether or not to invest; if he invests, then he always finances with limited liability debt. The SPtype entrepreneur will invest in the project if the expected project payoff is non-negative, i.e. V L (p S ) ≥ 0 or, using (1), if
otherwise he foregoes the investment and exits the market. The gross interest rate r SP represents the interest rate on a limited liability loan that makes the SP -type entrepreneur is indifferent between investing and exiting the market. If the lender charges less than this critical rate, then SP -type entrepreneur strictly prefers to invest in the project rather than exit the market. In what follows it will be convenient to define the parameters R I ≡ A/K > 1 and p ∆ ≡ p S /p R > 1. Using this notation, the condition for which the SP -type entrepreneur invests in the project can be rewritten as
where a strict inequality in (2) implies that SP -type entrepreneur invests with probability one. The parameter R I can be interpreted as a measure of the expected gross rate of return for the project and p ∆ as a measure of the dispersion in lenders' priors about project risk. We will say that R I measures the "investment effect" on the equilibrium, while p ∆ measures the "adverse selection effect." From (2) we can see that, holding all else constant, a higher value of R I will motivate the SP -type entrepreneur to invest. In contrast, inequality (2) tells us that, holding all else constant, a higher value of p ∆ will motivate the SP -type entrepreneur type to exit the market. Note also from (2) that, holding lender beliefs constant, smaller incorporation costs B are conducive to investment by the SP -type entrepreneur.
The issue facing the RW -type entrepreneur is how to finance the investment project. If the RW -type entrepreneur finances with unlimited liability debt, then his project payoff is V U = A − K . If, however, he finances using limited liability debt, then his expected project payoff is
The RW -type entrepreneur will finance with limited liability debt if V
otherwise he will finance with unlimited liability debt. The gross interest rate r RW represents the critical interest rate that makes the RW -type entrepreneur indifferent between financing with limited liability debt and financing with unlimited liability debt. Since financing with unlimited liability debt does not entail any incorporation costs, the RW -type entrepreneur will finance with limited liability debt only if the gross interest rate is strictly less than 1/p R . (Note that the above inequality tells us that r RW < 1/p R ) As above, it will be convenient to rewrite the condition under which the RWtype entrepreneur finances with limited liability debt as
where a strict inequality implies that the RW -type entrepreneur incorporates and issues limited liability debt with probability one. In contrast to (2), the investment effect R I is absent in (3), since the RW -type entrepreneur always invests. As in the case for the SP -type entrepreneur, a lower value for the incorporation cost B makes limited liability finance more attractive. The RW -type entrepreneur's financing decision depends upon the degree of adverse selection in the market, which is clear when we rewrite π/p R as πp ∆ /p S . Intuitively, a higher value of p ∆ is favorable for the RW -type entrepreneur since the interest rate on limited liability debt puts some weight project success probability p S , which lowers the cost of borrowing for a risky entrepreneur. So, in accordance with intuition, inequality (3) tells us that, holding all else constant, a higher value of p ∆ will motivate the RW -type entrepreneur to finance with limited liability debt. Considering the various strategies that the SP -and RW -type entrepreneurs may adopt, we see that there are four qualitatively distinct equilibrium configurations that can arise:
1. an underinvestment equilibrium is one where the SP -type entrepreneur, with probability one, does not invest.
2. a wealth separation equilibrium is one where all entrepreneurs invest and all wealthy entrepreneurs finance with unlimited liability debt and all poor entrepreneurs finance with limited liability debt.
3. a limited liability equilibrium is one where all entrepreneurs invest and with positive probability the RW -type finances with limited liability debt.
4. an limited liability-underinvestment equilibrium is one where the SPtype entrepreneur invests with positive probability (less than one), all other entrepreneurial types invest with probability one, and the RWtype entrepreneur finances his investment with limited liability debt.
Note that there is an adverse selection effect operation in equilibrium configurations 1, 3 and 4. In equilibrium configuration 1, the SP -type entrepreneur has a valuable investment project but because the market interest rate is "high" he does not invest; in equilibrium configuration 3, the RW -type entrepreneur increases the borrowing rate on limited liability debt; and in equilibrium 4, the SP -type entrepreneur does not invest with positive probability. In equilibrium configuration 2, wealthy entrepreneurs pay the appropriate risk adjusted borrowing rate and both types of poor entrepreneurs invest by using limited liability debt. Observe that these equilibrium configurations may be ranked (weakly) by the associated average level of investment and propensity of entrepreneurs to incorporate and issue limited liability debt. Equilibrium configuration 1 has the lowest levels of investment; equilibrium configuration 4 has higher levels of investment; and equilibrium configurations 2 and 3 have the highest. As the foregoing discussion suggests, an underinvestment equilibrium is most likely to arise when the gross productivity of investment projects is small relative to the potential for adverse selection, in the sense that R I is small relative to p ∆ . We, therefore, proceed by characterizing the various equilibrium outcomes assuming first that the adverse selection effect dominates the investment effect, in the sense that R I ≤ p ∆ , and then assuming the opposite, that R I > p ∆ . We emphasize that virtually all of the following analysis that follows simply considers the interaction of inequalities (2) and (3).
Equilibria: adverse selection effect dominates the investment effect
Intuitively, when the adverse selection effect dominates the investment effect, i.e., when p ∆ ≥ R I , a likely outcome is that there will be market failure, i.e. underinvestment. The reasoning is as follows. The cost of capital, r π , depends upon lenders' beliefs about project success, which, in equilibrium, depends on the actual probabilities of incorporation by the safe-and riskytype entrepreneurs. Investment by the SP -type entrepreneur creates a positive externality for the RW -type entrepreneur, to the extent that it lowers the cost of capital financed with limited liability loans. At the same time, however, incorporation by the RW -type entrepreneur creates a negative externality for the SP -type entrepreneur, which reduces the attractiveness of financing investment with limited liability debt relative to not investing at all. We now show that when the adverse selection effect dominates the investment effect, this latter externality is sufficiently strong to make the investment unprofitable for the SP -type entrepreneur.
If an underinvestment equilibrium exists, then the interest rate on limited liability debt must be equal to 1/p R because the RP -type entrepreneur is the only entrepreneur that finances with limited liability debt. In this equilibrium, π = p R and, since p ∆ ≥ R I , inequality (2) can never hold for strictly positive incorporation costs, i.e., for all B > 0
which implies that the SP -type entrepreneur strictly prefers not to invest.
Since the interest rate on limited liability debt is equal to 1/p R and it costs B to issue limited liability debt, the RW -type entrepreneur has no incentive to incorporate and finance with limited liability debt. This establishes:
Proposition 1: If p ∆ ≥ R I , then an underinvestment equilibrium exists for all
Next, consider the possibility of a wealth separation equilibrium, in which the RW -type entrepreneur finances with unlimited liability debt, while the SP -type entrepreneur invests and finances with limited liability debt. Intuitively, if lenders believe the SP -type entrepreneur will invest, then the interest rate on limited liability debt will turn out to be sufficiently low so that the RW -type entrepreneur also prefers to finance with limited liability debt. But, an interest rate on limited liability finance that deters the RW -type entrepreneur from using it will also deter investment by the SPtype entrepreneur. To see this, suppose that a wealth separation equilibrium exists. Then inequality (2) must hold, and inequality (3) cannot, where π = σp S + (1 − σ) p R . Combining the two inequalities, we get
But these inequalities cannot simultaneously hold since p ∆ ≥ R I and B > 0. Hence,
Proposition 2: If p ∆ ≥ R I , then a wealth separation equilibrium does not exist for any B > 0.
Consider now the limited liability equilibrium configuration, where the SP -type entrepreneur invests with probability one and the RW -type entrepreneur uses limited liability debt with probability µ. Let π(µ) represent the lenders' belief about project success. Bayes' rule implies that,
Note that π(µ) is decreasing in µ: if the RW -type entrepreneur chooses limited liability finance with a higher probability, then the lender's belief about project success must fall. A limited liability equilibrium will exist if both (2) and (3) hold. But, since p ∆ > R I , if (2) holds, then (3) holds strictly, which implies that the RW -type entrepreneur strictly prefers to finance with limited liability debt whenever the SP -type entrepreneur invests. It follows that the only limited liability equilibrium in this case is one in pure strategies, and it suffices to consider lenders' equilibrium beliefs about project success for only µ = 1. Simplifying (5), we get
where P (R|RW ) denotes the posterior probability that a project financed with limited liability debt is a risky, given that the RW -type entrepreneur incorporates with probability one. A limited liability equilibrium will, therefore, exist for some B > 0 if the inequality in (2) strictly holds at B = 0, or equivalently if
Substituting for π(µ = 1) in the above inequality, we see that a limited liability equilibrium will exist if
However, since the proposed equilibrium has p ∆ ≥ R I and P (R|RW ) < 1, it is not possible for condition (6) to hold; this, in turn, means that inequality (2) cannot hold for any B > 0, i.e.,
We can summarize this discussion by:
then a wealth separation equilibrium does not exist for any B > 0.
Finally, a limited liability-underinvestment equilibrium requires that an SP -type entrepreneur be indifferent between investing and not and that the RW -type entrepreneur finance with limited liability debt with probability one. A necessary condition for this equilibrium requires that
where
represents the probability that the project is successful given that the SPtype entrepreneur invests with probability φ. Condition (8) says that the SPtype entrepreneur is indifferent between investing and not investing. Note that π φ is increasing in φ, and that π φ = 1 = π µ = 1 . If φ = 1, then it must be the case that the left-hand side of (8) exceeds the right-hand side, since π φ = 1 = π µ = 1 , i.e., see inequality (7). But because π φ is increasing in φ, the left-hand side of (8) will exceed the right-hand side for all 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1; hence, condition (8) can never hold. We can summarize this discussion by:
then the limited liability-underinvestment equilibrium doess not exist for any B > 0.
In summary, propositions 1-4 imply that when the adverse selection effect dominates the investment effect, the equilibrium outcome is always characterized by underinvestment: the SP -type entrepreneur will exit the market and will not invest. As well, all wealthy entrepreneur finance their investment with unlimited liability debt and limited liability debt is "risky," i.e., r = 1/p R , as only the RP -type entrepreneur uses it.
Equilibria: investment dominates the adverse selection
When R I > p ∆ , the investment effect dominates the adverse selection effect, and the possibility of market failure is diminished. Unlike the analysis above, now an underinvestment equilibrium need not always exist. Such an equilibrium exists only if inequality (2) does not hold when the lender's beliefs satisfy π = p R . That is, an underinvestment equilibrium exists only if
Clearly, for B sufficiently "high," this inequality can exist. However, since R I > p ∆ , we can have 1 + B /K < R I /p ∆ for B sufficiently "small." At these low levels of B , the SP -type entrepreneur prefers to invest in the project even if the cost of capital is 1/p R . This is because the gross rate of return on the investment is sufficiently high to offset even the maximal cost of adverse selection in the debt market. This establishes, Proposition 5: If R I > p ∆ , then an underinvestment equilibrium exists for all incorporation costs
When the investment is sufficiently productive relative to adverse selection, i.e., when R I > p ∆ , the SP -type entrepreneur may be willing to invest even if the cost of capital is equal to 1/p R . As well, since the adverse selection effect is relatively small, the RW -type entrepreneur may not have an incentive to finance with limited liability debt even when both the RW -and SP -type entrepreneurs use this kind of finance. To see this, note that a wealth separation equilibrium-one where rich entrepreneurs use unlimited liability finance and poor entrepreneurs use limited liability-exists when inequality (2) holds and inequality (3) does not, where π = π µ = 0 = σp S + (1 − σ) p R , or in other words when
(Note that this inequality is identical to inequality (4)). Since R I > p ∆ and π µ = 0 > p R , the interval is non-empty for some B > 0; hence,
then a wealth separation equilibrium exists for intermediate levels of the incorporation cost B , where
When a wealth separation equilibrium exists, the choice of financial instruments is "neutral" in the cross-section: the cost of capital is unrelated to the decision to incorporate, and all firms invest optimally in equilibrium.
In a limited liability equilibrium, the SP -type entrepreneur incorporates and invests with probability one, the RW -type entrepreneur incorporates and finances with limited liability debt with probability µ ∈ (0, 1], and lenders' beliefs are given by the expected default probability π(µ) defined in (5).
From (2) and (3), one can see that the necessary condition for this equilibrium to exist is
That is, when the RW -type entrepreneur weakly prefers to finance with limited liability debt, the SP -type entrepreneur strictly prefers to invest because R > p ∆ . LetB 0 denote the highest incorporation cost consistent with the RW -type entrepreneur being indifferent between financing with limited or unlimited liability debt, i.e.,B 0 solves
(Note thatB 0 is equal to the lower bound in the interval described in proposition 6.) LetB 1 <B 0 denote the lowest incorporation cost consistent with the RW -type entrepreneur being indifferent between financing with limited or unlimited liability debt, i.e.,B 1 solves
In equilibrium, the probability with which the RW -type entrepreneur incorporates and finances with limited liability debt depends on the size of the incorporation costs, B . If B =B 0 , then the RW -type entrepreneur finances with unlimited liability debt with probability one; ifB 1 < B <B 0 , then the RW -type entrepreneur finances his investment with limited liability debt with probability µ ∈ (0, 1), where µ solves 1 + B /K = π(µ)/p R , and, with probability 1 − µ, he finances with unlimited liability debt; finally if B ≤B 1 , then the RW -type entrepreneur finances with limited liability debt with probability one. When B ≤B 0 , in equilibrium, the SP -type entrepreneur invests with probability one. The interest rate that lenders' offer for financing limited liability debt is 1/π µ forB 1 ≤ B ≤B 0 ; when B <B 1 , the interest rate on limited liability debt is 1/π µ = 1 . Note that on the interval (B 1 ,B 0 ), the probability that the RW -type entrepreneur incorporates is a strictly decreasing function of B , which in turn strictly decreases the expected default rate on limited liability debt. Thus we have, Although financial structure is irrelevant in this equilibrium in the sense that all profitable investments are undertaken under some organizational form, from the perspective of an individual entrepreneur it is not, and local changes in the cost of incorporation have predictable effects on the equilibrium cost of capital and the default rate of corporate firms.
Finally, an unlimited liability-underinvestment equilibrium will exist if: (i) the SP -type entrepreneur is indifferent between investing and not, i.e., condition (8), and (ii) the RW -type entrepreneur finances with unlimited liability debt, i.e., if
But since R I > p ∆ , it is not possible that conditions (8) and (9) can simultaneously hold. Therefore, Figure 1 characterizes the relationship between incorporation costs and the equilibrium interest rate on limited liability debt in the various possible equilibrium configurations. Proposition 5 showed that an underinvestment equilibrium exists for 1 + B /K ≥ R I /p ∆ ; in this situation the equilibrium interest rate on a limited liability loan is 1/p R . Proposition 6 showed that a wealth separation equilibrium with r = 1/π µ = 0 exists when
Note that since π µ = 0 /p R > 1, there always exists values of B at which an underinvestment equilibrium and a wealth separation equilibrium coexist. 7 Proposition 7 showed that a limited liability equilibrium, where the RW -type randomizes between limited and unlimited liability debt, exists when
Again, an underinvestment equilibrium may coexist with a limited liability equilibrium at a particular value of B or not, depending on the value of R I /p ∆ compared to π µ = 1 /p R and π µ = 0 /p R . underinvestment limited liability wealth separation Figure 1 : The equilibrium correspondence when δ < θ.
Discussion
In terms of addressing the historical puzzle-a dramatic fall in the cost of issuing limited liability debt in the US and UK resulted in a large increase in the use of limited liability debt in the US and essentially no change in the UK with similar outcomes for investment-our model can provide both a "fundamental-driven" explanation and a "belief-driven" explanation.
The fundamental-driven explanation would start with the observation that the capital/labor ratio in Britain was greater than that of the US in the mid-19 t h century. Hence, the rate of return to capital in the US exceeded that in the UK. Supposing that the adverse selection effect, p ∆ , is the same in both countries, then it is quite possible-owing to the differences in the rate of return on capital-that in the UK the adverse selection effect dominates the investment effect and in the US the investment effect dominates the adverse selection effect in the US. Therefore, in the UK, the only possible outcome is the underinvestment equilibrium, where the use of limited liability debt is constrained and the level of investment is "low." In the US, however, as the cost of using limited liability falls, i.e., B falls, then, the wealth separation and the limited liability equilibria can be supported, where in both cases the level of investment will be "high" supported by the use of limited liability debt.
The following definitions will be useful for a belief-driven explanation. Lenders will be said to have "optimistic beliefs" if they hold highest possible belief of project success for a limited liability financed entrepreneur that is consistent with an equilibrium and will be said to have "pessimistic beliefs" if they hold the lowest possible belief. We will consider how equilibrium outcomes are altered when the cost of incorporation falls under the scenarios where lenders have optimistic beliefs and lenders have pessimistic beliefs.
If lenders have optimistic beliefs, then the level of investment and the number of incorporations will increase as incorporation costs fall. This can be seen in figure 1: As incorporation costs fall, first there is an underinvestment equilibrium, then a wealth separation equilibrium and finally a limited liability equilibrium. On the other hand, if lenders have pessimistic beliefs, the economy can experience stagnation, i.e., the economy is "stuck" in an underinvestment equilibrium, even as the cost of incorporation become very low. In figure 1 , if investors have pessimistic beliefs, the incorporation costs have to decline significantly-below θ/δ-before the economy cannot be in an underinvestment equilibrium.
The predicted relationship between incorporation costs and interest rates on limited liability debt is however more subtle. When investment is relatively high profitability and investors have optimistic beliefs, observe that interest rates initially fall and then rise as the costs of incorporation decrease, as first high-quality then low-quality firms are induced to incorporate. Thus an apparent rise in interest rates following the reform need not signal an unfavorable climate for investment.
These observations are consistent with an "animal spirits" theory of institutional reform and economic development. When investors hold optimistic beliefs, the introduction of limited liability may induce a sharp decline in the cost of capital and a concomitant rise in investment, even when the cost of incorporation remains relatively high, while low investment may persist after the reform under pessimistic beliefs. Of course, such beliefs are self-fulfilling: a willingness of investors to hold limited liability debt is rewarded by better-quality issuance on average, and so empirical default rates that keep interest rates low. In this sense, the different experience of Great Britain and the United States with liability reform might be interpreted as equilibrium phenomena, even without differences in economic fundamentals in the two countries.
Some corporations in the mid-nineteenth century raised funds by issuing both debt and equity. Does the introduction of equity finance affect any of our results or insights? We explore this question in an appendix and find that, qualitatively speaking, all of our results remain intact. In fact, by redefining variables in the environment where entrepreneurs can raise funds by issuing debt and/or equity, the conditions for the existence of the various equilibria, as well as the diagrammatic characterization of these equilibria are observationally equivalent to the those that are characterized in the main text, (i.e., when entrepreneurs can only raise funds by issuing either limited or unlimited liability debt).
Conclusion
While our research was motivated by the evidence of development traps in the period following British liability reforms, the model presented is quite general. It is therefore natural to ask whether similar concerns arise in the modern era. Indeed, there is evidence that entrepreneurs continue to self-select in choosing liability status. Thus Horvath and Woywode (1996) report that, for a sample of modern German firms, limited liability is more likely to be adopted by firms that are riskier and that have greater capital demands, which is consistent with our model. While self-selection apparently persists, outside investors are considerably better informed now than in the past, so that adverse selection problems are attenuated. For example, there were very few reporting requirements for publicly traded companies in nineteenth-century Britain. Moreover, our model suggests that when the transactions costs incurred to obtain limited liability are small relative to total capital demands, underinvestment need not occur in equilibrium. Specifically, an equilibrium with full investment always exists for B /K sufficiently small. Moreover, when gross returns to investment are large relative to potential adverse selection costs (in the notation of the model, R > p ∆ ) the full investment equilibrium is unique when B /K is small. Thus development traps are unlikely to occur in the model for the parameter values that best represent the modern economic environment. We conclude that the problems of liability choice we have identified are probably of greatest relevance in periods of transition, such as nineteenth century Britain.
(ii) remain unincorporated and obtain K in capital markets by issuing unlimited liability debt (iii) completely forego the investment project and exit the market.
Investors-potential creditors and equity holders-observe these actions. If an investor decides to extend capital D ∈ [0, K + B ] to the entrepreneur in exchange for debt, then the investor offers a (gross) interest rate to the entrepreneur. If an investor decides to extend capital K + B − D to the entrepreneur in exchange for equity, then the investor offers a fraction (1 − α) to the entrepreneur. The fraction (1 − α) represents the share of the project's payoff, net of any debt payments, that goes to the equity holder. The entrepreneur will accept debt financing from the lender who offers the lowest interest rate and will accept equity financing from the investor who offers the smallest fraction (1−α). After financing has been arranged, the project is put into place. At date 1, the entrepreneur makes his effort decision: he either works hard or shirks. The investment project pays either A/p or 0 if the entrepreneur works hard, or either A /p or 0 if he shirks. If the entrepreneur is wealthy, he receives his private wealth payoff of w at this time. Payments are exchanged between the entrepreneur and the investors as specified in their debt and equity contracts and the game ends. If the entrepreneur incorporates, issues unlimited liability debt and equity, and retains α ownership, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, then the payoff to (outside) equity holders is (1 − α)(P − F ), where P represents the project payoff and F represents the promised payment to creditors. Note that it may be the case that (1 − α)(P − F ) < 0. 9 If the entrepreneur gets incorporated, issues limited liability debt and equity, and retains α ownership, then the payoff to (outside) equity holders is (1 − α) max{P − F, 0}.
To focus on interesting cases, we assume:
The first inequality implies A − c(A − A ) > A ; that is, hard work maximizes the value of the project. The second inequality gives the moral hazard problem some bite in equilibrium: Suppose that the project were undertaken under limited liability with 100 per cent equity finance. If investors belief that the entrepreneur will work hard, then in exchange for K + B units of
